http://d.hatena.ne.jp/matsuiism/20070414で、「ジジェク氏によれば、ナチズムとスターリニズムでは「犠牲者の地位」が異なるのであり、ハンナ・アーレントのように両者を「全体主義」という概念で一括りにすると、その違いが見えなくなってしまうという」と述べられている。また、
とも。
デートレフ・ポイカート氏も、「ナチ人種主義の最大の犠牲者は、ユダヤ人であった」ことを踏まえ、ナチ党の反ユダヤ主義が、「宗教的、国民主義的な理由からする伝統的な反ユダヤ主義」とは違って、「ユダヤ人の個々の要素ではなく、「ユダヤ人そのもの」という抽象的なもの、つまり人種主義がつくりだした人工的なイメージを標的にした」こと、そして「このような全面的なとらえ方に、「最終的解決」も全面的なものにならざるをえないことが暗示されていた」ことを指摘している。だが、ポイカート氏は、ナチズムの暴力がたんに「ユダヤ人」だけを標的にしていたのではないこと、むしろ「ナチスの人種理論が、あたらしい社会秩序のモデル、社会を内部から再編成するためのモデルを提示していたという点」に注目する。
ジジェクの２つの「全体主義」論についてはhttp://d.hatena.ne.jp/sumita-m/20060429/1146270669で言及した。ただ、アレントを弁護すれば、『全体主義の起源』において、たしかにスターリン主義については充分に議論されていない。それは資料の制約ということもあったのだろうけれど、哲学的な問題が絡んでいる。ナチスは（昨今の熱湯浴と同様に）哲学的にはちんぴらに過ぎなかったが、スターリン主義は一応マルクス主義を称しており、マルクス主義はヘーゲルを継承している。アレントにとって、スターリン主義の批判というのは遡って〈西洋哲学〉に対する全面的な批判に行き着かざるを得なかった。それが『人間の条件』で取り敢えずの結実を見ることになる思考の苦闘だったと取り敢えずはいえる。
また、後の方の引用に関しては、（さらにその先も含めて）アレントが指摘しているところなのではないかと思う。『全体主義の起源』の最終章”Ideology and Terror”。
The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest Book, Hb244)
- 作者: Hannah Arendt
- 出版社/メーカー: Mariner Books
- 発売日: 1973/03/01
- メディア: ペーパーバック
- クリック: 8回
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また、
An ideology is quite literally what its name indicates: it is the logic of an idea. Its subject matter is history, to which the “idea” is applied; the result of this application is not a body of statements about something that is, but the unfolding of a process which is in constant change. The ideology treats the course of events as though it followed the same “law” as the logical exposition of its “idea.” Ideologies pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process—the secret of the past, the intricacies of the present, the uncertainities of the future—because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas.
Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of being. They are historical, concerned with becoming and perishing, with the rise and fall of cultures, even if they try to explain history by some “law of nature.” The word “race” in racism does not signify any genuine curiosity about the human races as a field for scientific exploration, but the “idea” by which the movement of history is explained as one consistent process.
The “idea” of an ideology is neither Plato’s eternal essence grasped by the eyes of mind nor Kant’s regulative principle of reason but has become an instrument of explanation. To an ideology, history does not appear in the light of an idea(which would imply that history is seen sub specie of some ideal eternity which itself is beyond historical motion) but as something which can calculated by it. What fit the “idea” into this new role is its own “logic,” that is a movement which is the consequence of the “idea” itself and needs no outside factor to set it into motion. Racism is the belief that there is a motion inherent in the very idea of race, just as deism is the belief that a motion is inherent in the very notion of God. (p.469)
また、
As soon as logic as a movement of thought—and not as a necessary control of thinking—is applied to an idea, this idea is transformed into a premise. Ideological world explanations performed this operation long before it became so eminently fruitful for totalitarian reasoning. The purely negative coercion of logic, the prohibition of contradictions, became “productive” so that a whole line of thought could be initiated, and forced upon the mind, by drawing conclusions in the manner of mere argumentation. This argumentative process could be interrupted neither by a new idea(…) nor by a new experience. Ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction. The danger in exchanging the necessary insecurity of philosophical thought for the total explanation of an ideology and its Weltanschauung , is not even so much as much the risk of falling for some usually vulgar, always uncritical assumption as of exchanging the freedom inherent in man’s capacity to think for the strait jacket of logic with which man can force himself almost as violently as he is forced by some outside power. (pp.469-470)
さらに、アレントはこのような「イデオロギー」は19世紀から存在したが、「イデオロギー」の凶暴な可能性がフルに開花するのは20世紀の全体主義運動においてであるという（p.470）。さらに、20世紀の全体主義イデオロギーをその19世紀的な先輩たちから区別するのは、肝心の”idea”の空洞化と「論理性」の自律化である。
The device both totalitarian rulers used to transform their respective ideologies into weapons with which each of their subjects could force himself into step with terror movement was deceptively simple and inconspicuous: they took them dead seriously, took pride the one in his supreme gift for “ice cold reasoning”(Hitler) and the other the “mercilessness of his dialectics,” and proceeded to drive ideological implications into extremes of logical consistency which, to the onlooker, looked preposterously “primitive” and absurd: a “dying class” consisted of people condemned to death; races that are “unfit to live” were to be exterminated. Whenever agreed that there are such things as “dying class” and did not draw the consequence of killing their members, or that the right to live had something to do with race and did not draw the consequence of killing “unfit races,” was plainly either stupid or a coward. This stringent logicality as a guide to action permeates the whole structure of totalitarian movements and governments. It is exclusively the work of Hitler and Stalin who, although they did not add a single new thought to the ideas and propaganda slogans of their movements, for this reason alone must be considered ideologists of the greatest importance.(pp.471-472)
