Gestell

承前*1

手許にあったバタイユ入門書（酒井健『バタイユ入門』）にバタイユと岡本太郎の絡みへの言及は見つけられなかった。序でというわけでもないけれど、（バタイユの訳者でもある）湯浅博雄氏の『聖なるものと〈永遠回帰〉　バタイユ・ブランショ・デリダから発して』、「社会学研究会」時代のバタイユの同志でもあったロジェ・カイヨワ『聖なるものの社会学』をマークしておく。

バタイユ入門 (ちくま新書)

聖なるものと〈永遠回帰〉

聖なるものの社会学 (ちくま学芸文庫)

さて、今回の原発事故を巡って召喚されるべき哲学者といえば、やはりマルティン・ハイデガーなのでは？　特にそのGestellという概念。古東哲明『ハイデガー＝存在神秘の哲学』から少し抜書き；

（前略）じつに特異で〈変則的〉な近代科学技術（以下、テクノロジーとも表記）の「本質」を、ハイデガーはゲシュテルとなづける。「ゲシュテル」とは耳なれぬ言葉かもしれない。ドイツでは、足場とか書架とかフレームを意味する日常語。だがさらに、ある独特のニュアンスをもつ。たとえば召集令状のことを、ゲシュテルンクス・ベフェール（Gestellungsbefehl）という。戦場へかり出し、殺戮に駆り立て、追い立て、煽り立てる「強制的なフレーム」（Gestell）あって可能になる、出頭命令書のことである。
そんな召集令状ともひびきあう、「追い立て、駆り立て、徴用する強制的なしくみ、ないし根源力」のことを、ハイデガーはゲシュテルと名づけ、それをテクノロジーの本質という。科学技術は、人間が制作し、操作する便利な道具。そう、ぼくたちはふだん、素朴に思いこんでいる。だが、科学技術も言語や意識と同様に、その本性に分け入ってみると、もはや人間が制作し操作する〈用具〉などという、のどかな素顔をしていない。むしろ人間的自由や理知や主体的行動を支配する超人為的構造がその背後で糸をひき、人間をたくみに使役している〈媒体〉だ、ということがわかってくる。
テクノロジーをみずからが現れるための媒体にしているこの超人為的構造、それをハイデガーはゲシュテルとよぶのである。そしてそんなゲシュテルが君臨しそれにすっかり貫通され、仕組まれ、追い立てられて動く現代世界のありさまを、惑星帝国主義となづけた。（pp.256-247）

ハイデガー=存在神秘の哲学 (講談社現代新書)

また、ハンナ･アレントは「歴史の概念――古代と近代（”The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern”」（in Between Past and Future）の中で、『人間の条件』の議論を踏まえつつ、より原子力にフォーカスした仕方でこのことを論じている。；

In the modern age history emerged as astonishing it never had been before. It was no longer composed of the deeds and sufferings of men, and it no longer told the story of events affecting the lives of men; it became a man-made process, the only all-comprehending process which owed its existence exclusively to the human race. Today this quality which distinguished history from nature is also a thing of the past. We know today that though we cannot “make” nature in the sense of creation, we are quite capable of starting new natural processes, and that in a sense therefore we “make nature,” to the extent, that is, that we “make history.” It is true we have reached this stage only with the nuclear discoveries, where natural forces are let loose, unchained, so to speak, and where the natural processes which take place would never have existed without direct interference of human action. This stage goes far beyond not only the premodern age, when wind and water were used to substitute for and multiply human forces, but also the industrial age, with its steam engine and internal-combustion motor, where natural forces were imitated and utilized as man-made means of production. (p.58)

(…) it is important to be aware how decisively the technological world we live in, or perhaps begin to live in, differs from the mechanized world as it arose with the Industrial Revolution. This difference corresponds essentially to the difference between action and fabrication. Industrialization still consisted primarily of the mechanization of work processes, the improvement in the making of objects, and man's attitude to nature still remained that of homo faber, to whom nature gives the material out of which the human artifice is erected. The world we have now come to live in, however, is much more determined by man acting into nature, creating natural processes and directing them into the realm of human affairs, than by building and preserving the human artifice as a relatively permanent entity. (p.59)

Up to our own age human action with its man-made processes was confined to the human world, whereas man's chief preoccupation with regard to nature was to use its material in fabrication, to build with it the human artifice and defend it against the overwhelming force of the elements. The moment we started natural processes of our own―and splitting the atom is precisely such a man-made natural process―we not only increased our power over nature, or became more aggressive in our dealing with the given forces of the earth, but for the first time have taken nature into the human world as such and obliterated the defensive boundaries between natural elements and the human artifice by which all previous civilizations were hedged in.
(…) Unpredictability is not lack of foresight, and no engineering management of human affairs will ever be able to eliminate it, just as no training in prudence can ever lead to the wisdom of knowing what one does. Only total conditioning, that is, the total abolition of action, can ever hope to cope with unpredictability. And even the predictability of human behavior which political terror can enforce for relatively long periods of time is hardly able to change the very essence of human affairs once and for all; it can never be sure of its own future. Human action, like all strictly political phenomena, is bound up with human plurality, which is one of the fundamental conditions of human life insofar as it rests on the fact of natality, through which the human world is constantly invaded by strangers, newcomers whose actions and reactions cannot be foreseen by those who are already there and are going to leave in a short while. If, therefore, by standing natural processes, we have begun to act into nature, we have manifestly begun to carry our own unpredictability into that realm which we used to think of as ruled by inexorable laws. The “iron law” of history was always only a metaphor borrowed from nature; and the fact is that natural science can by no means be sure of an unchallegeable rule of law in nature as soon as men, scientists and technicians, or simply builders of the human artifice, decide to interfere and no longer longer leave nature to herself. (pp.60-61)

Between Past and Future (Penguin Classics)

The Human Condition

*1:http://d.hatena.ne.jp/sumita-m/20110506/1304660209