1. Life and Influence
2. The Phenomenology of the Social World
3.1 The Bergson Writings
3.2 The Social Sciences
3.3 Other Philosophies
Other Internet Resources
シュッツが理論的に関わった「アメリカの哲学者」に関して、Barber氏は（William Jamesは当然として）George Santanyanaを強調している。曰く、
While in the United States, Schutz published a collection of articles on a wide variety of topics, explaining and criticizing Husserl's thought; examining the works of American philosophers such as William James or George Santanyana; engaging continental philosophers such as Max Scheler or Jean-Paul Sartre; developing his own philosophical positions on the social sciences, temporality, language, multiple realities, responsibility, and symbolism; addressing socio-political questions dealing with strangers, homecomers, well-informed citizens, and equality; and treating themes in literature and music.
Although references to philosophers in the pragmatist tradition, such as John Dewey and George Herbert Mead are scattered through Schutz's writings, it was to William James that he devoted his first full-length essay after arriving in the United States. Briefly alluding to the methodological differences between Husserl and James, he emphasized two points where the “great masters” converged: the stream of thought and the theory of fringes. Both thinkers stressed that personal consciousness involves no multiplicity of elements needing to be reunited, but rather a unity from which one separates out components, and they each examined the modifications that reflection introduces into the lived stream, converting an “I” into a “Me” or uncovering the workings of intentionality. Further, Husserl's idea that the kernel of meaning distinguishing an object stood out against the unthematized network of relationships that makes up its horizon parallelled James's belief that topics have their “fringes ”. Such fringes connect a topic with other experiences, such that, for instance, one does not hear merely “thunder,” but “thunder-breaking-in-upon-silence-and-contrasting-with-it.” Similarly, the Jamesian idea about grasping as a unity what must be learned through a many-stepped processes, such as the Pythagorean theorem, could be translated into the Husserlian terminology regarding the monothetical grasping of polythetic processes. Likewise, James's discussion of focusing on an object within a broader topic resembled Husserl's view that one could discern a noema, that is, a perspectival aspect through which a thing constituted of many such aspects presented itself.
Another American philosopher to whom Schutz dedicated an entire essay was George Santayana, whose Dominations and Powers he reviewed. While most of the essay was expository, Schutz praised Santayana's effort to base politics on a philosophical anthropology and his insights into the enslaving potential of technology. However, Schutz, no doubt convinced by Mises's positive assessment of economic activity, resisted Santayana's reduction of it to domination. Likewise, as a phenomenologist opposed to a Santayana's naturalistic founding of spirit on the physical order of nature, Schutz dissented from a conviction derived from this naturalism, namely, that democracy could solve it problems only by returning to the “generative order” of agriculture.
The Structures of the Life-World represents a most complex and thorough restatement of many of the themes Schutz addressed throughout his life. After a more general account of the life-world and its relation to the sciences, the book takes up its various stratifications, such as provinces of meaning, temporal and spatial zones of reach, and social structure. Schutz and Luckmann then comment on the components of one's stock of knowledge, including learned and non-learned elements, relevances and types, and trace the build-up of such a stock. The authors study the social conditioning of one's subjective stock of knowledge and inquire about the social stock of knowledge of a group and different possible combinations of knowledge distribution (generalized and specialized). They consider how subjective knowledge becomes embodied in a social stock of knowledge and how the latter influences the former. In addition, the authors pursue such issues as the structures of consciousness and action, the choosing of projects, rational action, and forms of social action, whether such action be unilateral or reciprocal, immediate or mediate. A final section analyzes the boundaries of experience, different degrees of transcendencies (from simply bringing an object within reach to the experience of death), and the mechanisms for crossing boundaries (e.g. symbols).
Several thinkers have continued Schutz's tradition in philosophy and sociology, such as Maurice Natanson who emphasized the tension between individual, existential and social, anonymizing dimensions of everyday life experience. Thomas Luckmann, who served as co-author for the posthumous publication of Schutz's The Structures of the Life-World, developed the sociology of knowledge implications of Schutz's thought and stressed the differences between science and the life-world as well as the importance of language, symbolism, and the moral order of society. While John O'Neill has fused Schutz's thought with that of Merleau-Ponty by focusing on the lived, communicative body, Richard Grathoff has investigated the experience of normality within the bounded and situated context of a milieu. Ilja Srubar developed the pragmatic dimensions of Schutz's thought and several of its economic and political implications, Lester Embree clarified his typology of the sciences, and Fred Kersten has expanded his aesthetic insights. Drawing on Schutz's thought, Harold Garfinkel launched ethnomethodology, and George Psathas, a commentator on ethnomethodology, played a key role initiating the new discipline of conversation analysis.
Fred Kersten discovers in Schutz's musical writings important philosophical insights. For instance, music and inner time unfold polythetically and cannot be grasped monothetically; that is, one must live through the unfolding of a symphony or inner experience, and any conceptual summary of their contents inevitably fails to do justice to their meaning. However, since all conceptualization consists in a monothetical grasping of polythetic stages, Schutz is actually realizing that certain dimensions of consciousness elude conceptualization and thus demarcating the limits of rationalization, just as he had pointed out how certain provinces of meaning (e.g. dreams) evade theoretic comprehension or duration eludes memory. According to Kersten, Schutz has seen clearly that the passive associations of listening (e.g. recognizing the appearance of symphonic theme) differ from those of sight (e.g., apprehending an object like a house) and that listening does not identify numerically distinct items but produces an illusion of identification. Schutz's conclusion that sameness in music involves not numerical unity but recurrent likeness challenges the fundamental Husserlian thesis that the synthesis of passive identification is universal, at the basis of the constitution of the world.
Kersten, F., 1976, “Preface” to “Fragments on the Phenomenology of Music” in In Search of Musical Method, ed. F.J. Smith, London, New York, and Paris: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 6-22.
Sunnie D. Kidd
“Intersubjective Duree of Music”