ANDY CLARK “Extended Mind Redux: A Response” http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/extended-mind-redux-a-response/
“Out of Our Brains”*2の続篇。
A few commentators rightly suggested that mind itself is probably not a “thing” hence not worth trying to locate. That is not to say — heaven forbid — that it is a non-material thing. Rather, it might be a bit like trying to locate the adorableness of a kitten. There is nothing magically non-physical about the kitten, but trying to fine-tune the location of the adorableness still seems like some kind of error or category mistake. In the case of mind, I think what we have is an intuitive sense of the kind of capacities that we are gesturing at when we speak of minds, and so we can then ask: where is the physical machinery that makes those capacities possible? It is the physical machinery of thought and reason that the extended mind story is meant to concern.
Critics of the extended mind (for example, Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, in their 2008 book called “The Bounds of Cognition”) think theorists of extended cognition are guilty of confusing inputs to the cognitive engine with stuff that is part of (and “constitutes”) the cognitive engine. I think this distinction between “mere” inputs and processing elements in far less clear than it sounds. An analogy I sometimes use is with the workings of a turbo-driven car engine. Compare: the car makes exhaust fumes (outputs) that are also inputs that drive the turbo that adds power (up to around 30 percent more power) to the engine. The exhaust fumes are both outputs and self-generated inputs that, as they loop around, surely form a proper part of the overall power-generating mechanism. I think much the same is true of our use of bodily gestures while reasoning with others, and of the way that actively writing contributes to the process of thinking. The gestures and words on the page are outputs that immediately loop back in ways that form larger circuits of ongoing thinking and reasoning.